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Early in the Civil War, the Union Army drove pro-
southern Missouri leaders and their followers into Arkansas,
and the state fell under Federal occupation. However, many
people of southern sympathies remained in Missouri, and
between 1862 and 1864 Confederate forces launched four large
scale cavalry raids into the state from their Arkansas
bases. Major General Sterling Price, C. S. A., led the
fourth and largest of these raids, September through
November, 1864.
An ex-Governor of Missouri, Sterling Price was the
truly representative figurehead of the state's Confederate
element. Throughout the war, he constantly believed that an
oppressed, hidden majority of Missourians restlessly awaited
the day when they could free themselves from Federal
domination. Fearing that the Confederate cause was nearly
lost, Price and his followers hoped to revive the hearts of
southern sympathizers by a raid into Missouri. Political
and military circumstances motivated General E. K. Smith,
commander of the South's Trans-Mississippi Department, to
authorize the expedition, and in September 1864 Price
entered Missouri at the head of a 12,000 man cavalry force.
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Price's expedition was a total fiasco. The expected
uprising did not occur, and most of the 5,000 men who joined
Price subsequently deserted. After suffering a crushing
defeat at Pilot Knob, Missouri, Price's army moved across
the central part of the state, and the invasion that was
meant to redeem Missouri for the Confederacy turned into a
chaotic, large-scale looting expedition. After being routed
at Westport, Missouri, on October 23, Price's army fled
south and subsequently disintegrated.
The expedition was basically an expression of the
South's desperate desire in the fall of 1864 for a smashing
victory that would change the tide of the war. However, the
expedition's total failure weakened the South's Trans-
Mississippi forces to such a degree that no major campaigns
occurred in that department for the last six months of the
war.
Chapter One
Origins and Early Movements
Major General Sterling Price's 1864 Missouri Expedition
was the last major campaign west of the Mississippi during
the Civil War. The longest cavalry action of the war, it
lasted over three months and encompassed over fifteen
hundred miles. Born of politics, it was plagued throughout
by political considerations on both sides, and ended on the
day that Abraham Lincoln's reelection insured that eventual
northern victory would not he forestalled by a political
compromise. The results of the campaign were so disastrous
to the Confederacy that relative peace prevailed on the
Trans-Mississippi front until the end of the war.1
One of the leading politicians of ante-bellum Missouri,





figurehead of the Confederate element of the
Virginia in 1809, as a young man he moved
to Missouri where they settled at
the Missouri River. He soon became a
prosperous tobacco planter and slaveowner, and in 184t he
was elected to the state legislature. In 1842 he became
William Forse Scott, "The Last Fight For Misuri,"




speaker of the Missouri House of Representatives, and two
years later secured a seat in the House of Representatives
in Washington. However, he was not renominated, and when
the Mexican war broke out he resigned his seat to command a
cavalry regiment. At the end of the war, he returned to
Missouri with the brevet rank of brigadier general and a
greatly enhanced reputation.
In 1852, Price ran for governor as a pro-slavery
democrat, winning by a substantial majority. His war
record--plus his personal charm and impressive physique made
him, according to one supporter, "unquestionably the most
popular man in Missouri." He occupied the governorship
during the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and though he
refrained from aiding the Missouri "Border Ruffians" in
their efforts to force slavery into Kansas, he did nothing
to restrain them.
Though Price was pro-slavery, he was not a
secessionist. He was a southern moderate who opposed
secession except as a last resort on the part of the South
to protect itself against Northern aggression. As war
approached, Price hoped that the Union would be preserved,
but northern attempts to coerce Missouri forced Price into
the southern camp. He immediately took command of the
state's secessionist force, the Missouri State Guard, and
led it to early victories at Wilson's Creek and Lexington.
He then accepted a commission as a major general from the
3
Confederate government, and urged his men to volunteer for
Confederate service.
In 1862, after the Federal victory at Pea Ridge,
Arkansas, Price and his division of Missouri volunteers were
transferred to Mississippi where they fought in the battles
of Corinth and Iuka. Price alone was transferred back to
Avkansas in 1863, and participated in the attack on Helena,
the defense of Little Rock, and in the Red River Campaign.
He had been as successful as any other field commander in
the Trans-Mississippi, and the small degree of success the
Confederacy had gained in these operations were usually due
to his leadership. His concern for the welfare of his
troops caused them to idolize him, and the Missourians had
given him the affectionate nickname of "Old Pap."
But if Sterling Price was a military hero in the
popular mind, he wasn't with his superiors. He had been
involved in controversies with every general whom he had
served with or under, and harbored resentment toward all of
his civilian superiors, up to and including Jefferson Davis.
Price was a politician whose military outlook was completely
colored by his political aspirations Throughout the war,
Price's main objective was to free Missouri from Federal
rule. This set him at odds with his superiors, who looked
upon the Trans-Mississippi's role as a supporting one.
On March 16, 1864, Price was assigned to command the
District of Arkansas, with headquarters at Camden. He
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accepted the assignment, even though he preferred to remain
"footloose" to command an expedition that he hoped would
break the Federal occupation of Missouri a:x1 bring the state
into the Confederacy. Finally, in the fall of 1864,
circumstances and General Edmund Kirby Smith gave him his
long awaited opportunity.'
From his headquarters in Shreveport, Louisiana, Smith
commanded the Confederacy's Trans-Mississippi department.
An 1845 graduate of West Point, his performance in Virginia
and Kentucky led to his rapid promotion to Lieutenant
General, and in February, 1863, he was given command of all
of the Confederacy west of the Mississippi. Smith ruled
over a vast area that was far removed from the war's major
area of operations, and the fall of Vicksburg further
isolated him from the rest of the Confederacy. Because of
his tremendous responsibilities, Smith was promoted to full
general in February, 1864.'
After repulsing Federal forces in the Red River
Campaign in May, 1864, Smith began contemplating his next
move. Since Federal naval power made a move against New
Orleans impractical, he decided upon the destruction of
Union outposts in northern Arkansas, and a subsequent
'Biographical information on Sterling Price obtained
from the following sources: Ezra J. Warner, Generals in 
Gray (Baton Rouge, 1959), 246-47; Albert Castel, General 
Sterling Price and the Civil War in the West (Baton Rouge,
1968), 3-7, 283-85.
'Warner, Generals In Gray, 279-80.
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invasion of Missouri. Accordingly, he sent Brigadier
General Jo Shelby into northeastern Arkansas to attack the
Federal supply line between Little Rock and Devall's Bluff
and recruit for the impending campaign. In the meantime,
Smith directed Price to gather supplies and intelligence for
the intended northern offensive.
However, Smith had no intention of allowing Price to
lead the campaign. Of all Price's superiors, Smith was the
most contemptuous of him. Smith considered Price "castoff
material," capable of neither "organizing, disciplining, nor
operating an army." Smith had given Price command of the
District of Arkansas with great reluctance, and hoped it
would be temporary.4
Smith hoped to launch the expedition about mid-August,
when the troops, horses and equipment used in the Red River
Campaign would be rested and refitted. His choice as
commander had been Major General Richard Taylor, whom he
regarded as the best general in his department. Though
Taylor accepted the assignment and began outlining a plan of
operations, he requested a transfer east after quarreling
with Smith over the conduct of the Red River Campaign.
Though he did not immediately find a replacement for Taylor,
4
War of the Rebellion: A compilation of the Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (128 Vols.,
Washington, D. C., 1880-1901), Ser. 1, Vol. 24, Pt. 1, 486-
87; Pt. 2, 869-70; Pt. 3, 828-29; Vol. 41, Pt. I, 478.
Hereafter cited as Q. John N. Edwards, Shelby and His Men,
or the War  in the West (Cincinatti, 1867), 317-18.
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Smith continued making preparations.5
Meanwhile, top ranking Missouri officials, both
political and military, were growing concerned that the year
would end without an attempt to expel the Union forces from
their state. For the past two years, the Trans-Mississippi
Confederates had conducted several cavalry raids into
Missouri from bases in Arkansas, each with varying degrees
of success. Fear that the pro-southern element in Missouri
would lose hope and reconcile themselves to the Union
military rule caused them to advocate another such moveLent
more strongly as the summer wore on.
On July 18, 1864, Thomas C. Reynolds, Missouri's
Confederate governor-in-exile, wrote to General Price and
suggested a raid into Missouri. Reynolds felt that a small
scale raid would be a favorable alternative in the absence
of a full-scale invasion. Reynolds claimed that President
Jefferson Davis was "impatient for an advance into Missouri"
which, even if unsuccessful, would compel the Union to pull
forces away from Virginia and Georgia. Also, the expedition
would be aided by recruiting. Reynolds then asked Price if
he would be willing to command it.6
Naturally, Price concurred wholeheartedly with
Reynolds' suggestion. On July 23, Price sent a similar
aB, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 478; Pt. 2, 1011, 1052; Pt.
4, 1028.
612B, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 2, 1011.
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proposal to Kirby Smith. Believing from his abundant
intelligence sources that pro-soutnern sentiment in Missouri
was strong, Price told Smith that he was "assured that the
Confederate flag floats over nearly all the principal towns
of North Missouri, and large guerrilla parties are formed
and operating in the southern portion of the state." He
also believed that at least 30,000 men could be recruited.
Two days later, Reynolds also wrote to Smith calling for a
cavalry raid into Missouri.7
Meanwhile, the eastern Confederacy was falling into a
desperate state of affairs. The summer of 1864 found the
Army of Northern Virginia locked in the trenches at
Petersburg and the Army of Tennessee retreating toward
Atlanta. As a result, the Confederate high command began
looking toward the Trans-Mississippi to remedy, or at least
relieve, the critical situation in the East. On July 22,
General Braxton Bragg, military advisor to Jefferson Davis,
was in Columbus, Georgia, evaluating the situation around
Atlanta. Recognizing the seriousness of the situation,
Bragg sent a dispatch to Kirby Smith ordering him to
transfer General Taylor's infantry east, with other infantry
that could be spared to follow later.8
The execution of this order was nearly impossible.
7Ibid., 1023; Castel, Sterling Price and the War in  the
West, 200.
2E, Series 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 90.
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Bragg failed to consider the individualistic nature of the
rugged, Trans-Mississippi, Confederate soldier. He
possessed little sense of national loyalty to the
Confederacy, and preferred to fight in his own section of
the country where he could be close, as one officer put it,
to "Sarah and the children." Also, political leaders in
Arkansas took a firm stand against the movement. Governor
Harris Flanigan complained bitterly to Davis, and Senator
Augustus Garland told Secretary of War James Seddon that the
Arkansans would "throw down their arms" before obeying such
an order. The men had not been paid in nearly a year,
resulting in low morale and increasing desertions. But
above all, the order failed to recognize the difficulties of
moving troops across a river that was constantly patroled by
Union gunboats.9
Since Smith was unable to send his infantry east, the
Missouri expedition was his only alternative to contribute
to the war, and in late July he decided to get it started.
Smith was encouraged by Price's favorable predictions and by
the fact that nearly all of the Union volunteer regiments
raised in Missouri had been sent east, which left only
inexperienced militia units scattered across the state.
Also, guerrilla resistance was so bad that it appeared that
Missouri seethed with revolt and was ready to join any major
9W. L. Webb, Battles and Biographies of Missourians. or. 
The Civil War Period of Our State (Kansas City, 1900), 209;
gE, Series 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 2, 1038, 1048, 1059, 1067.
9
Confederate invasion. 0
During the first four days of August, Smith, Price,
Reynolds, and other political leaders met in Shreveport to
work out the details of the expedition. Then, on August 4,
Smith placed Price in command. The choice was due, in all
probability, to the supposed influence Price had in
Missouri, the fact that he was the only officer of high
enough rank who wanted it, and that Smith was afraid not to
name him in view of the row which might have resulted. But
on the other hand, Smith would get a new district commander
and be rid of Price, if only for a while. As commander of
the expedition, Price was forced to relinquish command of
the District of Arkansas. He was immediately replaced by
Major General John Bankhead Magruder, and reassigned to
command only the cavalry of the district."
Also, despite Smith's decision to invade Missouri, he
still ordered Taylor to attempt to move his infantry east of
the Mississippi. Smith's abandoning a major offensive by
sending his infantry to attempt a crossing that he knew was
impossible instead of sending them into northern Arkansas to
support Price's movements in Missouri suggests that he
lacked confidence in Price's ability from the start:2
W
OR, Series 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 4, 1068-69; Pt. 1, 307.
11(2E, Series 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 92-93; Pt. 2, 1039-41;
Paul Jenkins, The Battle of Westport (Kansas City, 1906), 181;
Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 378.
12
Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 380-81.
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Smith ordered Price to conduct the invasion with the
cavalry of the District of Arkansas organized in three
divisions commanded by Generals James F. Fagan, John S.
Marmaduke, and Jo 0. Shelby. St. Louis, with its supplies
and military stores, was to be the primary objective, since
acquiring it would "do more to rallying Missouri, than the
possession of any other point." if forced to retreat, Price
was to move through Kansas and Indian Territory and sweep
the country of livestock and military supplies, while
bringing back as many recruits as possible. Price was
additionally instructed to "scrupulously avoid all acts of
wanton destruction and devastation," and to impress upon his
men that "their aim should be to secure success in a just
and holy cause and not to gratify personal feelings and
revenge. 13
Additionally, Price personally added a political
objective--that of gaining control of enough Missouri
territory, at least temporarily, to hold an election for a
new governor and legislature. This would not only allow the
Missouri Confederates to keep alive their claim tc the
state, but also remove Reynolds, whom Price had never been
fond of, from the scene. Reynolds, legitimately fearing
that his own civil authority might be overruled by military
authority under Price, decided to accompany the expedition
13 gE, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 2, 1040-41.
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to keep an eye on events.14
Because of a delay in obtaining ordnance stores, Price
did not leave Camden until August 28. The following day he
arrived in Princeton, Arkansas, and assumed command of
Fagan's and Marmaduke's divisionb. Price had previously
ordered Shelby, who was still in northeastern Arkansas, tc
attack Devall's Bluff and the railroad between Little Rock
and the White River to divert the Federal's attention from
his own movements. In an exploit that Price called "one of
the most brilliant of the war," Shelby captured six forts
and 400 prisoners, inflicted 300 casualties and destroyed
ten miles of track. Though not part of Price's
instructions, the forays of Brigadier General Stand Watie's
Indian Brigade into southern Kansas also helped divert the
Federal 's attention. 15
Price, Fagan, and Marmaduke marched northward from
Princeton on the morning of the 30th. Fearful that his
delay in starting had alerted the Federals of his intended
route, Price decided to cross the Arkansas above Little Rock
rather than below. After sending a feinting column across
the Saline River, he turned the main column toward
Dardanelle where they arrived on September 6. Finding the
river low enough that the pontoons brought from Camden were
%
Castel, Sterling Price and the War in the West, 202-
203, 206.
QE, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 625-26; Pt. 2, 1095-96; Pt.
3, 235.
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not needed, Price's army crossed the Arkansas the following
day. By raising the wagons' contents up high enough, the
whole command was able to ford it.I6
Once across the Arkansas, Price had overcome his first
major obstacle-that of breaking through the thin line of
Federal outposts along the river under the command of Major
General Frederick Steele. Price then moved northeast toward
Batesville, Arkansas, with the two divisions in separate
columns. After minor skirmishing, they reached the White
River eighteen miles above Batesville on September 12 where
Price learned that General Shelby was at Powhatan, about
sixty miles northeast of Batesville and on the route into
Missouri. Price then decided on the town of Pocahontas as a
rendezvous point, and went to find Shelby."
Despite the fact that northeast Arkansas abounded in
slackers, deserters and bandits, Shelby had enrolled about
8,000 men into Confederate service, recruiting those who
wished to volunteer and conscripting those who did not. He
then placed them in camps of instruction and organized them
into regiments and brigades. After meeting Price near
Batesville on the 13th, Shelby ordered his command and the
newly formed units to report to Pocahontas the next day.
Price then began organizing his three division invasion
16 QE, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 626; William L. Cabell,
Report of General W. L. Cabellis Brigade in Price's Raid in
Missouri and  Kansas in 1864 (Dallas, 1900), 3.
17
OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 626-27.
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force, which he named the "Army of Missouri.08
Major General Fagan's Division, the largest in the
army, consisted of four brigades of Arkansans. James
Fleming Fagan, a native of Clark County, Kentucky, had
served in the Mexican War and in the Arkansas legislature.
After Arkansas seceded, Fagan was commissioned colonel of
the First Arkansas Infantry, and his distinguished conduct
at Shiloh won him a promotion to brigadier general. He was
then sent back to the Trans-Mississippi where he took part
in the battles of Prairie Grove, Helena, and Little Rock.
Though he proved to be of average military ability, he was
promoted to major general prior to the Red River Campaign.
The most formidable brigade in Fagan's Division was
that of Brigadier General William L. Cabell, whose nickname
"Old Tige" reflected his disposition. Cabell's Brigade was
the largest brigade of the Army of Missouri, consisting of
2800 "number one" veterans who were well mounted and armed
mostly with Enfield rifles. Colonel William Slemonsi
Brigade also consisted of veteran troops, but Fagan's other
two brigades, those of Colonels Archibald S. Dobbin and
Thomas H. McCray, were formed from regiments that had
recently been recruited by Shelby:9
18
OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 627, 651; Edwards, Shelby
and His Men, 317-18.
19
Information on General Fagan and his division
obtained from Warner, Generals In Gray, 85-86; Cabell,
Cabell's Report, 2; OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 641.
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John Sappington Marmaduke was a member of one of
Missouri's old aristocratic families. His father, once
governor of the state, sent him to Harvard and Yale before
securing him an appointment to West Point. Marmaduke
graduated from West Point in 1857, and was serving on the
frontier when the war began. He immediately resigned his
second lieutenant's commission, and after serving briefly
with the Missouri State Guard, he was commissioned by the
Confederacy. His distinguished action as colonel of the
Third Arkansas Infantry at Shiloh secured him a brigadier's
commission, and subsequent battles and raids in Missouri and
Arkansas earned him a reputation as a hard fighter.
The backbone of Marmaduke's Division was his old
brigade, now commanded by Brigadier General John B. Clark,
Jr. Clark's father had served under Price as a division
commander in the Guard in 1861, and later as a Missouri
representative in the Confederate congress. Ably commanded,
Clark's Brigade consisted of 1200 men whose equipment was
fair and whose horses were in "moderate" condition.
Marmaduke's other brigade, that of Colonel Thomas Freeman,
consisted of regiments conscripted by Shelby.n
Joseph Orville Shelby was a native of Lexington,
Kentucky, and a relative of Revolutionary War hero and first
governor of Kentucky, Isaac Shelby. As a young man Shelby
20
Information on General Marmaduke and his division
obtained from Warner, Generals In Gray, 52, 211-12; QE, Ser.
1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 678-79.
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moved to Waverly, Missouri, where his rope manufacturing
business made him one of the wealthiest men in the state.
He participated in the Kansas-Missouri border forays of the
late 1850's, and in 1861 h, entered the Missouri State Guard
as a captain of cavalry and fought at Wilson's Creek,
Lexington, and Pea Ridge. In the summer of 1862 he
recruited his famous Iron Brigade of Missouri cavalrymen,
and led them through battles in Arkansas. He was promoted
to brigadier general for his dashing raid into Missouri in
the fall of 1863, and his recent campaign in northeast
Arkansas had further enhanced his reputation.2/
Consequently, the Iron Brigade, now commanded by
Colonel David Shanks, was the best outfit in the Army of
Missouri. It was made up of 1500 tough, battle-hardened
Missourians, most of whom carried a revolver or two in
addition to a rifle or carbine. Though lax in discipline,
they were reliable in battle and would prove the mainstay of
the army throughout the campaign. Shelby's other brigade,
Colonel Sidney D. Jackman's, consisted of 1600 men recently
recruited in Missouri, three-fourths of whom were unarmed.22
Though designated cavalry, Price's 12,000 man invasion
force was actually mounted infantry. But as the largest
cavalry force ever assembled during the Civil War, the Army
of Missouri was marred by a number of serious problems.
21
Warner, Generals In Gray, 273-74.
22 gE, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 670, 678, 718.
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About 4,000 troops were unarmed, and 1,000 lacked mounils.
Its arms, which were issued, captured or brought from home,
were a hodge-podge of calibers, which would make ammunition
resupply difficult. Though the army had fourteen pieces of
artillery, they were all small calibers and mostly
smoothbores. The major exception was a four-gun battery of
parrots in Shelby's Division under the command of Captain
Dick Collins, a hard fighting artillery officer who believed
in engaging his guns alongside of the cavalry, if not ahead
of them. The baggage train, which consisted of about 300
"wheezy" and rickety wagons and ambulances, was
indispensable for carrying supplies through a barren
country, but a serious impediment to a cavalry column. The
brigade of Colonel Charles Tyler, which consisted of the
unarmed men, assisted the teamsters with the train.
Discipline was lax, and the newly formed Arkansas brigades,
which consisted mostly of conscripts whose main desire was
to go home to "Nancy and the baby," would shortly prove
problematical •23
23
OR, Ser. 3, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 626-27, 662, 702-26;
Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 461, 478; Jenkins, The Battle
of Westport, 144, 147; John Darr, "Price's Raid into
Missouri," Confederate Veteran, 11 (Aug. 1903), 359.
Chapter Two
The Confederate Advance to Lexington
The Army of Missouri spent four days at Pocahontas,
organizing, shoeing mules and horses, distributing
ammunition and making other necessary preparations.
Speeches were made, reminding the soldiers of the true
purpose of the expedition and their expected conduct during
it. On the morning of September 19, the army marched
northward in three columns--Shelby on the left, Price and
Fagan with the baggage train in the center, and Marmaduke on
the right--with ten to thirty miles between each column to
maximize the use of roads and forage. That same day, all
three columns crossed into Missouri and headed for
Fredericktown where they were to rendezvous before moving on
St. Louis. After minor skirmishing in the flanking columns,
the army reassembled at Fredericktown on the 25th. For the
first time in over two years, "Old Pap" was back in
Missouri. However, he was not unexpected.24
It was said that in Missouri during the Civil War there
were five seasons-"spring, summer, fall, Price's Raid, and
winter." Since 1861, Price, or other Missourians, had




intermittently raided into the state, usually in the late
summer and fall. Since early spring, Price's intentions to
invade Missouri had been known through the lodges of the
Order of the American Knights, a Copperhead organization in
Missouri. Rumors to this effect became stronger as fall
approached, and the ripening of the corn added weight to
them.6
Also, the fact that the guerrilla bands in Missouri
were increasing in size and ferocity helped support the
belief that a major Confederate invasion was imminent.
Price was known to utilize guerrillas in his operations, and
after taking command of the expedition he sent the
guerrillas an order (actually a request) to "make North
Missouri as hot as...[they]...could for the militia." This,
Price hoped, would keep the Union militia's attention away
from southern Missouri and St. Louis. The guerrillas
immediately moved north of the Missouri River and began a
campaign of ambush and robbery that placed the area under a
reign of terror and paralyzed rail transportation.26
Major General William S. Rosecrans, who had been
transferred to Missouri because of his defeat at Chickamauga
the preceeding fall, commanded the Federal Department of
6gR, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 307; Jenkins, The Battle
of Westport, 36.
M
OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 307; John N. Edwards,
Noted Guerrillas, or, The Warfare of the Border (St. Louis,
1877), 283.
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Missouri, with headquarters in St. Louis. Through
intelligence reports and common sense, he had strong reasons
to believe an invasion of his department was imminent, but
did not know when and where it would come. To meet the
coming emergency, Rosecrans had managed to raise five
complete and as many more incomplete regiments of twelve-
month volunteers, and was promised the loan of several 100-
day regiments from Illinois. Then, on September 3, after
learning that Shelby was at Batesville waiting to be joined
by General Price, Rosecrans requested to General Henry
Halleck in Washington that the 16th Army Corps be sent to
his aid. Major General Andrew J. Smith's division, which
was moving up the Mississippi from Vicksburg to join Sherman
in Georgia, was stopped a. Cairo, Illinois, and ordered to
St. Louis. Major General Joseph Mower's division, which had
been sent to Little Rock in early September
city, moved overland in pursuit of Price on
to protect the
September 18.27
After learning that Price had crossed the Arkansas but
still unsure of his exact route, Rosecrans ordered his
district commanders at Springfield, Sedalia, Jefferson City
and Rolla to concentrate their militia. On September 24,
Rosecrans received word that Shelby was in the vicinity of
Farmington, Missouri, near Fredericktown. Alarmed,
V
'OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 307-8; William Forse
Scott, The Story of a Cavalry Regiment-The Story of a 
Cavalry Regiment-The Career of the Foruth Iowa Veteran
Volunteers From Kansas to Georgia 1861-1865 (New York,
1893), 313.
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Rosecrans ordered Brigadier General Thomas Ewing, commander
of the Southeast District, to concentrate his forces at
Pilot Knob and Cape Girardeau. Ewing immediately took one
brigade of Smith's infantry south from St. Louis on the Iron
Mountain Railroad toward Pilot Knob, patrolling and
strengthening the garrisons at the bridges. Later that day,
he set up temporary headquarters at Mineral Point where he
learned that Price was at Fredericktown with a large force.
On the 25th, Ewing took one regiment and moved by rail to
Pilot Knob where Major James Wilson had collected all the
available troops in the area. These two forces gave Ewing
an aggregate of about 1,000 men.m
Fort Davidson, a hexagonal-shaped earthwork, was the
main defense work of Pilot Knob. It consisted of a nine-
foot dirt parapet topped with sandbags, with its six sides
surrounded by a moat ten feet wide and over six feet-deep
which was partially filled with rain water. Two rifle pits
ran several hundred yards from the fort to the southwest and
north. It mounted four 32-pound siege guns, three 24-pound
howitzers, three 12-inch mortars, and had been bolstered by
six field guns. A level plain, broken only by a dry creek
bed about 150 yards to the south and east, extended from the
fort for about a thousand yards in all directions.
Though the fort was impregnable to an infantry assault,
it was commanded on three sides by mountains, the most
28 (2E, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 308, 445-46.
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prominent of which were Pilot Knob and Shepherd's Mountain.
Both were located about 1,000 yards south of the fort, and
accurate sniper and artillery fire from them could soon
render the fort untenable. Ewing had chosen the site
because a better one could not be found. His instructions
from Rosecrans were to hold the fort against any detachment
of the enemy, but to evacuate if the main force moved
against it.29
That same day, Septmber 25, Price conferred with his
division commanders as to the expedition's next course of
action. He had received word that St. Louis was heavily
defended and of Ewing's presence at Pilot Knob. Shelby, the
junior division commander, wanted to push immediately to St.
Louis. His scouts had reconnoitered Pilot Knob, and he
didn't believe it would justify the cost of an assault.
However, Marmaduke and Fagan urged that Ewing be disposed of
before advancing on St. Louis. Price decided on the latter,
ostensibly because he did not want to leave a garrison in
his rear; but in all liklihood, he had concluded that it
would be impossible to take St. Louis. An easy victory over
Ewing, he reasoned, would lift his troops morale and raise
the spirits of the Confederate sympathizers in the state.m
The next morning, Price sent Shelby's Division
29c0R, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 446.
MgE, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 628; Cyrus A. Peterson
and Joseph M. Hanson, pilot Knob.„_The Thermopylae of the 
West (New York, 1914), 99-100.
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galloping northward to destroy the track and bridges of the
Iron Mountain Railroad to prevent Ewing from being
reinforced. Price then moved with Fagan's and Marmaduke's
Divisions west from Fredericktown toward Arcadia. Late in
the afternoon, Fagan's scouts ran into Wilson's pickets at a
strategic mountain pass called Shut-In Gap, several miles
east of Arcadia. After heavy skirmishing, the Confederates
seized the gap and pressed toward Arcadia with the intention
of moving northward through Ironton to Pilot Knob. However,
Ewing reinforced the detacnment at Ironton, placed Wilson in
command, and pushed the Confederates back to Shut-In Gap.
Then Fagan, closely supported by Marmaduke, drove the
Federals back to Arcadia where rain and darkness ended the
fighting 31
At daylight on the 27th, the Confederates attacked and
pushed the Federals back through Arcadia and Ironton.
Though Wilson's men fought desperately to hold the gap
between Pilot Knob and Shepherd's Mountain, they were forced
back within the walls of Fort Davidson where the rest of the
garrison was preparing for the attack.m
On the advice of his chief engineer, Captain T. J.
Mackey, Price planned to shell the fort. But shortly after
opening the bombardment from atop Shepherd's Mountain, some
3121E, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 447, 628-29, 706-707;
Peterson and Hanson, Pilot Knob, 101-47.
32gE, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 447-48.
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the lives of southern adherents held prisoner
This information, which Price apparently did not
undoubtedly led him to agree with Fagan and
Marmaduke, who advocated a direct assault. Price then
ordered the two division commanders to prepare for an
attack.
Marmaduke deployed Clark's Brigade on the north slope
of Shepherd's Mountain, and Fagan took a position to his
right. Cabell's Brigade occupied the gap between the two
mountains, with McCray and Slemon's at the base of Pilot
Knob. Dobbin's Brigade was positioned north of the fort to
block the Potosi Road, the fort's only practical escape
route. Drawing on his past experiences, Price personally
emphasized to Marmaduke's and Fagan's officers the need for
coordination, stressing the need for both divisions to
assault simultaneously and in line.m
Before ordering the attack, Price called on Ewing twice
to surrender. Ewing refused,
against the Confederates. He
reasons for not wanting to be
the District of the Border in
believing he could hold out
also had strong personal
captured. While commanding
1863, he had issued the
infamous Order No. 11 from his headquarters in Kansas City.
This order, issued in the wake of Quantrill's raid on
Lawrence, Kansas, required the eviction of the citizens from
Ma, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 629, 707-14.
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four border counties in western Missouri, and caused great
suffering. Many of those affected were now serving, or had
relatives, in Price's army. Ewing knew that if he were
captured he would likely be killed. Earlier that day the
Confederates had captured Major James Wilson, whom they held
responsible for outrages against southerners in the Pilot
Knob area, and executed him along with six Union privates.
Also, Ewing's second-in-command was Colonel Thomas Fletcher,
the Republican candidate for governor of Missouri. Ewing
and Fletcher would have been prize prisoners, and it is
possible that their capture was one of Price's motives in
ordering the assault on Fort Davidson.34
Around three o'clock, two cannons on Shepherd's
Mountain signaled the advance, and Fagan's and Marmaduke's
men moved forward on foot. Despite Price's warning, he
divisions did not keep in line. Clark's Brigade encountered
rough terrain while moving down Shepherd's Mountain;
therefore Fagan's men debouched on the plain first.
Immediately facing a hailstorm of shot and shell, Fagan's
entire right wing, Slemons and McCray, broke before they had
advanced a hundred yards. Only Cabell's veterans continued
charging, moving at the double, and stopping occasionally to
fire and reload. Though gaps were knocked in their ranks at
every step, they kept going until they reached the meat
where they tried to scale the walls. Desperately, the
Castel, Sterling Price and the War in the West, 214.
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Federals began tossing small artillery shells fused as hand
grenades over the top of the fort down into the moat.
By the time Clark's Brigade reached the plain, it was
badly out of alignment, with the right side far ahead of the
left. Although the left took cover in the creekbed, the
right of the brigade kept going until they joined Cabell's
men in trying to fight their way up the walls of the fort.
But General Cabell, after having his horse shot from under
him and realizing that the walls were too high to be scaled
without ladders and no support was coming, ordered the
Confederates to fall back.
Meanwhile, Price made every effort to rally Fagan's
troops, who eventually reformed their ranks. Fagan, angered
and humilated by his troops poor conduct, pleaded with Price
for another attack. but Price refused. General Cabell, who
had opposed attacking from the start, told Price that he had
made "a damned wise decision. "35
After dark, the dispirited Confederates bivouacked for
the night. Determined to attack the fort the next day,
Price ordered Mackey's engineers to make scaling ladders and
sent Shelby an order to hasten back to Pilot Knob. However,
Shelby did not receive that order, nor a dispatch sent the
previous day instructing him to rejoin the main army.
35The account of the Confederate assault on Fort
Davidson is based on the following sources: OR, Ser. 1, Vol.
41, Pt. 1, 448, 629, 679-80, 687-88, 698, 707-709, 715-17;
Peterson and Hanson, Pilot Knob, 165-210; Cabell, Cabell's 
Repo_, 5-6.
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Unaware that Price needed him, Shelby continued his mission
on the Iron Mountain Railroad, destroying three bridges and
miles of track. After skirmishing with the Union infantry
at Mineral Point, he fell back and bivouacked at Potos4,
twenty-five miles northwest of Pilot Knob. 36
Ewing had won a stunning victory! With only 900 men,
but with strong artillery support, he had repulsed two-
thirds of Price's army and inflicted around 1200 casulties.
But his position was perilous. Though he had lost only 73
men in the defense of Fort Davidson, the two days of
fighting had reduced his command by one-fourth, and he knew
it would be impossible to hold out against the well
coordinated assault he believed Price was planning. After
consulting with his officers, Ewing decided to evacuate the
fort and retreat northward by way of Potosi to Mineral
Point. Around two o'clock that morning, Colonel Fletcher
led the infantry out of the fort and through the trench on
the north side to the Potosi Road. After covering the
drawbridge with tents and straw to muffle the noise, the
cavalry and six field guns moved out and joined the
infantry. 3'
360R, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 629, 653; Pt. 3, 960.
37Ibid., Pt. 1, 448-49. An exact count of Confederate
casualties is unknown since Price and most of his
subordinate officers did not detail the number of casualties
sustained in the assault on Fort Davidson in their official
reports. The Confederates had good reason to gloss over
their losses in this engagement. Various estimates run from
1,000 to 1500 killed and wounded.
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Although a huge pile of burning charcoal at the north
base of Pilot Knob that had been ignited by exploding shells
made the valley "as light as noonday," the Federals moved
out unchallenged. Dobbin's men, who were camped along both
sides of the road, made no attempt to stop them. Colonel
Fletcher believed that the Confederates must have seen them,
but mistook them for a body of their own troops shifting
positions. A detail left behind in the fort blew up the
powder and ammunition in the magazine, and though the
explosion shook the valley and hills for miles around, the
Confederates believed it was an accident, and did nothing.
Price, who was staying at a house in Arcadia, did not
learn until daylight that Ewing had escaped. Infuriated, he
ordered Marmaduke to pursue him. Though Shelby had received
neither of Price's orders but completed his railroad
mission, he left Potosi at dawn and headed south toward
Pilot Knob. Meanwhile, Ewing reached Caledonia where he
captured sone of Shelby's scouts, and learned that his
troops at Mineral Point had retreated. With this new
information he moved west toward Rolla. Several hours
later, Shelby and Marmaduke joined forces and pursued.
Although Ewing was on foot and being slowed by refugees that
had joined his column, steep cliffs on both sides of the
road prevented the mounted Confederates from flanking him,
and strong rearguard actions with his artillery prevented
them from charging up the road.
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The pursuit continued throughout that day, night, and
into the next day. Marmaduke's men dropped back from
exhaustion, but Shelby pressed ahead. On the evening of
September 29, Ewing went into a defensive position at
Leesburg. Though Shelby made a heavy attack in the
darkness, it was repulsed. The next morning, Shelby and
Marmaduke surveyed the Federal position and decided not to
attack. The Confederates then headed for Sullivan's Station
to rejoin Price, and Ewing moved to Rolla to help in the
defense of that important supply base. 38
Price remained in the vicinity of Pilot Knob until
September 29. Having abandoned hope of capturing St. Louis,
he headed for Jefferson City where he hoped to achieve his
political goals. During the first week in October, the Army
of Missouri wound its way leisurly across the central part
of the state. Rampaging far and wide, they captured
countless small and isolated militia garrisons, "liberated"
dozens of towns, tore up track and burned bridges of the
Pacific Railroad, and "exchanged" worn out horses for fresh
38The account of Ewing's flight from Pilot Knob to
Leasburg Is based on the following sources: OR, Ser. 1,
Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 449-51, 629-30, 653, 673, 680; Thomas
Fletcher, "The Battle of Pilot Knob, and the Retreat to
Leasburg," War Papers and Personal Reminiscences, Missouri 
Military Order of the Loyal Legion (St. Louis, 1892), 1:44-
50. The reason that the Confederates allowed Ewing to move
up the Potosi road unchallenged is unknown. Colonel Dobbin,
whose brigade was guarding that particular area, made no
report, nor did his division commander, General Fagan.
Price, in his official report, did not explain it.
29
ones."
They also looted. Although Price had issued strict
o-iders against such unlawfulness before the army left
Pocahontas, the practice began in the vicinity of Pilot
Knob, where Price appointed Lieutenant Colonel John P. Bull
as provost marshall general of the army. Though Bull
organized a fifty man provost guard for each brigade to
prevent straggling and plundering, the practices continued.
The army's wide dispersion, with its main column stretched
out for five or six miles, made it difficult for the guards
to maintain control.
Also, the slow movement of the cumbersome wagon train
gave the soldiers ample time to roam about and forage. The
train, which originally consisted of about 300 wagons, soon
grew to over 500 wagons, many of which were being used to
carry the "fruits" of the expedition. Accompanying the
train was "a rabble of deadheads," stragglers who gave the
army the appearance of a "Calmuck horde." The incompetency
and indifference of many of the line officers, and the fact
that much of the army consisted of unwilling conscripts
added to the slow rate of march and lack of discipline. As
time went on, the more seasoned veterans began to fear that
"OB, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 630-31, 653-54; Castel,
Sterling Price and  the War in the West, 222.
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"the odious train would occasion disaster to the army."°
On October 6, Shelby forced a crossing of the Osage
River six miles below Jefferson City. During the fighting,
Colonel David Shanks, commander of the Iron Brigade, fell
mortally wounded. Though Shelby replaced him with Colonel
Moses Smith of the 11th Missouri Cavalry, the following day
Price ordered Brigadier General M. Jeff. Thompson, M.S.G.,
to command his star unit. Thompson, who early In the war
had earned the reputation as the "Swamp Fox" of southeast
Missouri, had joined the expedition at Pilot Knob without an
assignment, having been recently exchanged as a prisoner. 41
Meanwhile, General Rosecrans had been keeping Smith's
infantry positioned between Price and St. Louis, but after
he determined that the Confederates were moving west,
ordered Smith to follow. General Mower's division of the
16th Corps, which had moved overland from Little Rock to
Cape Girardeau, moved to St. Louis by river transport. Once
rested and refitted, they were sent up the Missouri to
Jefferson City. Rosecrans had placed Brigadier General
Clinton Fisk, commander of the District of North Missouri,
in charge of the defenses of Jefferson City, and by October
7 the city was ringed with formidable entrenchments.
4°0R, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 648, 719-20, 722-26;
Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 471; M. Jeff. Thompson,
Memoirs of M. Jeff. Thompson (Missouri State Historical
Society, Columbia, MO.), 124.
410R, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 654, 663; Thompson,
"Memoirs," 124.
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Knowing that he did not have enough men to operate
offensively against Price, Fisk placed all of his cavalry
under Colonel John F. Philips and sent them to the Osage
with orders to vigorously contest its passage, then withdraw
to the city. But after retreating from the Osage on the
6th, Philips took up a new position behind Moreau Creek
where he was joined by Brigadier Generals John Sanborn and
John McNeil and their cavalry from Springfield and Rolla. 42
On the morning of the 7th, Fagan assumed the
Confederate advance and pushed toward the capital. At
Moreau Creek he met stiff resistance, but gradually pushed
the Federal cavalry back to the city's defenses. The
Confederates then occupied the heights in full view of the
city, the capitol, and the fortifications. But after
reconnoitering and exchanging a few shots, Price pulled back
two miles to the south and bivouacked. He had received
information that 15,000 troops were defending Jefferson
City, and was undoubtedly fearful of another Pilot Knob.
After consulting with his division commanders he decided to
move toward Kansas, hoping to recrui, as many men as
possible from the strongly pro-Confederate hemp and tobacco
counties along the Missouri River. That night, Price
ordered Shelby to move west immediately, and the next day
the main army made a demonstration before the city's
420R, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 310-11, 354-55, 357-58,
418-19; Scott, The Story of a Cavalry Regiment, 316-17.
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fortifications before also moving west."
That sane day, October 8, Major General Alfred
Pleasonton arrived in Jefferson City and assumed command of
all the forces in the area. Pleasonton had commanded the
cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac during its growing
stages, but was transferred to Missouri because Meade
disliked him and Grant wanted Major General Philip Sheridan
to command the eastern cavalry. Though Pleasonton was still
smarting from the order that had shelved him in an obscure
theater, he was eager to fight. He immediately sent General
Sanborn and all of the cavalry after the Confederates with
orders to harass them but not to push them too hard.
Pleasonton remained in Jefferson City to finalize plans with
Rosecrans, who had ordered Smith's and Mower's infantry to
that point."
On the afternoon of the 9th, Shelby, far in the
Confederate advance, overwhelmed the small militia force at
Booneville. Price and the main column reached Booneville on
the 10th, where the city's pro-southern element turned out
and gave the ragged troopers an enthusiastic welcome. About
1200 recruits joined the army during its stay in Booneville,
but most of them were unarmed, and attached to Tyler's
43q& Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 631.
"IM Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 311, 340; Edward
Longacre, "Alfred Pleasontom The Knight of Romance," Civil
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Brigade.45
Additionally, 100 guerrillas under Captain William T.
"Bloody Bill" Anderson reported to Price. On September 27,
the same day Price attacked at Pilot Knob, Anderson and his
gang stopped a train at Centralia and executed 22 unarmed
Union soldiers found on board, and later that day ambushed
and killed almost to a man a 150-man militia force that was
pursuing them. Anderson, who hpd one sister killed and
another permanently crippled during the collapse of a prison
where Union authorities were holding them, was a
psychopathic killer, as were many of his men. Many of them,
including Anderson, had Union soldiers scalps decorating
their bridles. Though he disapproved of these ghastly
trophies, Price immediately ordered Anderson to operate
against the North Missouri Railroad, and sent orders to
other guerrillas to destroy the Hannibal and St. Joseph
Railroad."
On the 11th4 Sanborn attacked the Confederates east of
Booneville, but Fagan and Marmaduke drove him back several
miles. The following day, the Confederates left Booneville,
whose citizens were probably as glad to see them leave as
they had been to see. them arrive. The Army of Missouri had
450R, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 631-32, 655.
44T% Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt.
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continued its looting and, according to Governor Reynolds,
"the wholesale pillage in ...[Booneville]...made it
impossible to obtain anything by purchase," with stragglers
even robbing families of soldiers in Confederate service.°
Having learned that there were a large number of arms
scored at Glasgow, Price ordered General Clark to take his
and Colonel Jackman's brigades across the river and assault
the town at dawn on the 15th while Shelby supported from the
west bank with sharpshooters and a section of Collins'
Battery. Clark and Jackman crossed the river by raft at
Arrow Rock on the 14th, but due to delays in crossing were
about an hour late in attacking. Therefore, Shelby's
opening up on time gave the Federal garrison, which
consisted of 800 men under Colonel Chester Harding, plenty
of time to prepare. Clark and Jackman met Harding east of
the town, and quickly pushed him back to his main works in
the center of town, then advanced under the cover of houses
and fences. Harding surrendered when the Confederates got
to within fifty yards of his earthworks, and he and his men
were paroled and escorted to Zooneville to prevent their
being killed by guerrillas. Though Harding had burned all
of ie military supplies that he could before surrendering,
Clark captured 1200 muskets and overcoats, 150 horses, and a
steamboat which was used for ferrying recruits to the south
°OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 631-32; Edwards, Shelby
and His Men, 471.
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bank of the river."
Simultaneously, Price ordered Thompson and the Iron
Brigade to attack the Federal garrison at Sedalia. On the
14014 they moved to Longwood, where they were joined by a
battalion of recruits under Lieutenant Colonel Alonzo
Slayback, and learned that Sanborn's cavalry had passed
between Longwood and Sedalia that day. The following day,
Thompson learner l that Smith's infantry were on the LaMine
River. Believing that he could operate between these bodies
of troops and escape, Thompson headed for Sedalia. The Iron
Brigade hit the Federal pickets on the main road into town,
drove them into their e.rthworks,
section of Collins' Battery. The
the earthworks and fled the
hundred muskets and pistols
town.
along
and opened on them with a
Federals then evacuated
Thompson captured several
with several wagonloads of
military supplies. The prisoners were paroled, and after
dark the Iron Brigade moved back to find the main body."
While the side expeditions to Glasgow and Sedalia were
in progress, Price halted the army west of Marshall for two
days. Many of Shelby's and Clark's men were from this area,
and they took unofficial leave to visit their families. But
if the Missourians enjoyed a holiday, the Arkansas troops
suffered from hunger and sickness. Unfamiliar with the
  Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 436-38, 632, 656-57, 674-
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country, General Fagan was unable to make adequate
arrangements to supply his command with food, clothing and
blankets. As a result, "catarrh, bronchitis, pneumonia,
rheumatic affections and glandular swellings" ran rampant in
the Arkansas division."
After Clark and Thompson had rejoined the army, Price
moved to Waverly where he camped on the night of October 18.
The following morning he marched toward Lexington, the scene
of his great victory in 1861. But time was running out for
"Old Pap." His delays and slow rate of march since leaving
Jefferson City gave the Federals time to mobilize their
forces. North of Price was a bridgeless Missouri River.
Behind him was Rosecrans with 9,000 infantrymen under Smith
and 7,000 cavalrymen under Pleasonton. And waiting for him
around Kansas City with a force of 20,000 was Major General
Samuel Ryan Curtis. J'
The fifty-nine year old Curtis was the son of a
Revolutionary War veteran and an 1831 graduate of West
Point. After serving in the army one year, he resigned his
commission and went into civil engineering and studied law.
He served in the Mexican War, then moved to Iowa where he
was elected to Congress in 1856. Curtis was serving his
third successive term when the war broke out, and resigned
his seat to accept a commission. In 1862, he led the
"OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 4, 1003-1004, 1012.
mIbid., 633; Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 409.
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Federal army that defeated Price and Van Dorn at Pea Ridge,
Arkansas, and was then given command of the Department of
Missouri. However, his meddling in Missouri's volatile
political situation caused his removal by Lincoln, and he
was reacIsigned to command the Department of Kansas, which
was composed of the districts of Colorado, Nebraska, North
and South Kansas, and Upper Arkansas."
Curtis first learned of Price's movements on September
17 after returning to his headquarters at For: Leavenworth
from an extended operation on the plains against hostile
Indians. With most of the 7,000 troops in his department
scattered in remote places, he began concentrating those
imnediately available. Five cavalry regiments were
stationed along the Kansas-Missouri border, and a force
under General James G. Blunt chasing Indians west of Fort
Lamed were recalled to Leavenworth. Needing more troops,
Curtis knew he had to call out the Kansas State Militia. On
the 20th, he asked Kansas' governor, Thomas Carney, that the
militia "be ready to cooperate against the foe." Carney
replied that he would have the militia stand by, but
expressed reluctance for them to serve in the field. Curtis
then assured Carney that he hoped to use the militia for
garrison duty only.
"Ezra J. Warner, Generals In Blue (Baton Rouge, 1964),
107-108.
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Governor Carney's lack of alarm was due to several
reasons. First, Curtis was unsure of Price's exact
movements, and possessed no knowlege of his intentions.
Second, the people of Kansas felt more secure than they had
since the wzr began. The Confederacy's Trans-Mississippi
forces were far south in Arkansas and Texas, and closer to
hone, Order Number 11 had helped to push the guerrilla
operations away from Kansas and into central Missouri. The
Indians were the only real menace to Kansas, and their
threat was limited to the far western settlements.
Believing that the war was over for them, most Kansans were
more interested in the upcoming state election between
Carney and another Republican, Samuel Crawford, who was
being backed by Senator James Lane.
Like many members of his faction, Carney believed it
unlikely that Price would invade the state. Carney and his
followers, who regarded Curtis as little more than a tool of
Lane, suspected that Curtis' design in mobilizing the
militia was simply a political trick to keep voters from the
polls, either preventing the election or making it possible
for the Lane faction to win it. Lane's past political
career and his unscrupulous reputation made it easy for his
opponents to believe that he was capable of such a scheme.
On October 8, Curtis placed Major General James G.
Blunt in command of the District of South Kansas, and
opposition to the mobilization intensified. The Carney
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faction regarded it as a scheme to put him in command of the
entire Kansas State Militia. A native of Maine who had been
strongly involved in the abolitionist politics of
territorial Kansas, Blunt was a bitter enemy of Carney and
Lane's political and military henchman. Blunt's entry into
the Civil War was simply an extension of his jayhawking
career, but he quickly proved himself an aggressive fighter,
distinguishing himself in the campaign to take northwest
Arkansas. But in October, 1863, along with 100 members of
his escort, he was ambushed by Quantrill's guerrillas at
Baxter Springs, Kansas. Nearly all of his men were
slaughtered, and Blunt himself barely escaped. Since tnat
time he had been under censorship, and the force he was
leading near Fort Lamed consisted of only a battalion. He
was now more than eager to restore his reputation- 54
Then, on October 9, Curtis received word from Rosecrans
that Price had left Jefferson City and was moving west.
Carney then had no choice but to call cut the militia, which
he placed under the command of Brigadier General George
Dietzler. The following day, Curtis declared martial law to
bolster the proclamation, and began organizing the Army of
the Border. Businesses closed and harvesting stopped as men
poured into rendezvous points, and by the 15th, 15,000 men
were assembled along the state line. But there was still
54Albert Castel, "War and Politics: The Price Raid of
1864," The Kansas Historical Quarterly, 24 (Sumner, 1958),
129-33; Warner, Generals In Blue, 37-38.
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distrust among the leaders, which forecast future
troubles."
Blunt established his headquarters at Paola, Kansas,
but on the 14th, moved to Hickman Mills, Missouri, where he
organized the Provisional Cavalry Division of the Army of
the Border. Colonels Charles R. "Doc" Jennison of "Kansas
Redlegs" fame and Colonel Thomas Moonlight commanded the
First and Second Brigades, which were made up of volunteers.
Colonel Charles Blair, commander of the Fort Scott garrison,
commanded the Third Brigade, which consisted of militia and
a few volunteers. The militia was under the direct control
of Brigadier General William Fishback and Colonel James
Snoddy. A few days later, Fishback and Snoddy, who thought
the Price invasion was a hoax, attempted to take the militia
back to Kansas. But they were overtaken by General Blunt,
placed under arrest, and the militia was marched back to
Hickman Mills where they elected new officers."
Curtis planned to defend first at the Big Blue River,
and if forced to retreat, fall back to the entrenchments at
Kansas City. He had been strengthening the earthworks
around Kansas City ever since he learned of Price's
presence, and now ordered Colonel Blair and the Third
OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 468-72; "Price's
Invasion," Congregational Record 6 (Oct. 1864), 117.
"OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. I, 572-73; James G. Blunt,
"General Blunt's Account of His Civil War Experiences,"
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Brigade to the Big Blue where they aided the engineers in
felling trees, and constructing abatis, breastworks and
rifle pits. All the while the Carnoy faction insisted that
the militia not be moved east of the Big Blue."
After dark on the 16th1 Blunt moved the First and
Second Brigades to Pleasant Hill in an effort to locate
Price. The following morning, he moved to Holden where he
was joined by a band of Missouri militia from Warrensburg
who reported that Shelby had captured Sedalia and was now
entering Warrensburg. Hoping to verify this information,
Blunt sent a detachment from the militia back to Warrenburg
while he rested his command. After dark, he learned by
telegraph that Price was below Waverly, that A. J. Smith was
at California, Missouri, and that Pleasonton was twelve
miles northwest of Sedalia.
Blunt, hoping to unite with these forces and destroy
Price, sent Curtis a request for additional troops to be
sent to Lexington. The following day, Blunt reached
Lexington where he received definite word that Price was at
Waverly, twenty miles east. The following morning, Blunt
received word from Curtis that no troops could be sent to
Lexington because of the situation with the militia. Blunt
then deployed his forces on an open plain east and south of
the town, hoping to resist Price's advance long enough to
570R, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 473, 597.
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develop his strength and intentions.58
Meanwhile, Price had received word of Blunt's seizure
of Lexington, and on the morning of the 19th, the Army of
Missouri moved west from Waverly toward Lexington in three
columns. Around two o'clock that afternoon, Shelby's
Division, in the middle, struck Blunt's pickets about a mile
east of Lexington. Though the Federals resisted stubbornly,
they fell back as Fagan and Marmaduke moved more troops to
Shelby's assistance. Realizing that his flanks would soon
be in danger, General Blunt ordered a withdrawal down the
Independence Road, with Colonel Moonlight's Second Brigade
covering the rear. Shelby's men followed, pursuing them
well after nightfal1.59
Blunt continued his retreat throughout the night,
reaching the Little Blue Rii.er, nine miles east of
Independence, the next morning. Finding the west side of
the stream suitable for a defense, he positioned his men and
artillery and sent a request to Curtis that food and the
remainder of the volunteer troops be sent forward. But
Curtis instructed Blunt to leave two or three squadrons at
the Little Blue, and fall back to Independence. However,
Blunt left Colonel Moonlight's entire brigade with
instructions to report any contact with Price and resist his
"Ibid., 573; Blunt, "General Blunts Account of His
Civil War Experiences," 253-55.
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advance as long as possible. At Independence, where Carney
and his political staff were trying to induce disaffection
in the ranks of the militia, Blunt argued with Curtis the
importance of defending at the Little Blue. Blunt pointed
out that if the Confederate cavalry crossed that stream they
would be in open country and able to fan out and flank south
of the fortifications on the Big Blue. However, the
situation with the militia made it imperative for Curtis to
defend at the Big Blue."
"Mt, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 574; Blunt, "General
Blunt's Account of His Civil War Experiences," 255-56.
Chapter Three
Action Before Westport
The Army of Missouri spent the night of October 19 at
Lexington, and the following day moved west to Fire Prairie
Creek. At dawn of the 21st, they continued westward, with
Clark's Brigade of Marmaduke's Division in the advance.
Around seven o'clock, Clark's skirmishers ran into
Moonlight's pickets about a mile east of the Little Blue.
The Federals quickly fell back across the river and pushed a
wagonload of burning hay onto the bridge, forcing Clark to
cross at a ford a half mile below. Clark ordered his
regiments into line as quickly as they got across, and
Freeman's Brigade followed. Moonlight's
back, utilizing stone fences, trees, and




Marmaduke having three horses shot from under him.
That morning, Curtis changed his mind and decided to
delay Price as long as possible at the Little Blue. As
General Blunt was leaving Independence with the First
Brigade and the newly formed Fourth Brigade under Colonel
James H. Ford, he received word from Moonlight that Price
was attacking in force. Blunt pushed rapidly for the Little
Blue and arrived just as the Second Brigade had been driven
44
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back to the crest of the bluegrass ridges a mile west of the
river. The Federal cavalry quickly deployed, and began
forcing Marmaduke back.
Price then called on Shelby, who was in the rear behind
Fagan. The men of the Iron Brigade shouted insults and
catcalls at the Arkansans as they galloped toward their
first hot fight of the campaign. Shelby deployed on
Marmaduke's right, which gave the Confederates the advantage
in numbers. Though Blunt had a superior position and
several units with repeating weapons, he soon found his
flanks in danger, and ordered a withdrawal. Shelby pressed
the retreating Federals all the way to Independence, where
skirmishing in the streets and sniping from the houses
continued until darkness ended the fighting on the west side
of town. According to Shelby, who was not at Pilot Knob,
the campaign up to this time had been a "walkover," but at
the Little Blue this ceased to be the case.61
That evening, Blunt joined Curtis west of the Big Blue.
Though Curtis' defensive line ran from the mouth of the
Big Blue on the Missouri River fifteen miles south to
61
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Russell's Ford, he had concentrated most of his forces at
the main ford on the Independence Road. He believed that
since this was the most direct route into Kansas City, it
was the one Price would take. But Blunt argued that Price
would try to flank at one of the smaller fords upriver.
After failing to convince Curtis, Blunt sent Moonlight's and
Jennison's brigades to guard Simmons' and Byram's Fords,
where secondary roads running from Independence to Westport
crossed the Big Blue. Further south, at Russell's Ford, a
force of 1200 militiamen waited under Brigadier General M.
S. Grant.
With Curtis in position, it was imperative that
Rosecrans move quickly on Price's rear. But Curtis and
Rosecrans had lost telegraph communication, due to the fact
that the Confederates were between them. Therefore, Curtis
sent a scout, Dan Boutwell of the Kansas State Militia,
through the Confederate army with a request that Rosecrans
hurry forward. After a night of hairbreath escapes.
Boutwell found General Pleasonton, and gave him Curtis'
request 
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Major General Alfred Pleasonton had caught up with
Sanborn and the cavalry at Dunksburg, Missouri, on the 19th,
and immediately organized the Provisional Cavalry Division
62gB, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 478-79, 575; Blunt, "General
Blunt's Account of His Civil War Experiences," 257.
63"Price's Invasion," Congregational  Record, 6 (Nov.
1864), 123.
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of the Department of Missouri. The First, Second and Third
Brigades consisted primarily of Missouri State Militia and
were under the commands of Brigadier Generals Egbert Brown,
John McNeil and John B. Sanborn. The Fourth Brigade, under
Colonel Elward F. Winslow, consisted of the cavalry from
General Mower's division. All told, Pleasonton had a force
of 7,000. From Dunksburg, Pleasonton had moved west, and
was camped on the east bank of the Little Blue when Boutwell
found him on the morning of the 22nd. Pleasonton then
crossed the Little Blue and pushed rapidly toward
Independence.64
That same morning, the Army of Missouri moved from
Independence toward Kansas City with Shelby in the advance
and Marmaduke and Fagan protecting the wagon train. Shelby
ordered Colonel Sidney D. Jackman's brigade to make a feint
at the main ford, and then moved Thompson and the Iron
Brigade to Byram's Ford. As the Confederates charged across
the ford, they met stiff resistance from Jennison, who was
in a strong position on the west bank. Shelby then sent
flanking forces up and downstream, who quickly dislodged
Jennison from his position. After crossing to the west
bank, Thompson detached Colonel Frank B. Gordon's 5th
Missouri Cavalry to guard the left flank of the wagon train,
then pressed after Jennison. Jackman, having completed his
mgE, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 340.
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mission at the main ford, moved south and joined Shelby.65
When Curtis realized the Confederates were flanking, he
immediately alerted Generals Blunt and Grant. Blunt, upon
hearing the firing at Byram's Ford, ordered Colonel
Moonlight to help Jennison. Moonlight arrived too late, but
comprehending what had happened, he moved toward Westport
where he hoped to unite with Jennison and prevent Shelby
from entering Kansas.66
On the south end of the Federal line, General Grant
sent large scouting parties in all directions when he heard
that the Confederates were flanking. About 300 of Grant's
militiamen under the command of Colonel George Veale of the
2nd Kansas State Militia were falling back to join Jennison
when they ran into Gordon's 5th Missouri at the Mockbee
Farm. Knowing they could not outrun the Confederate
cavalry, the doctors, farmers, lawyers and shopkeepers
turned soldiers formed a battle line and opened fire with
their rifles and howitzer. After two unsuccessful charges
against the Kansans, Gordon called to Shelby for help.
Shelby sent Jackman to Gordon's assistance, and after
forming, the Confederates charged straight through the
Kansans' ranks, killing and capturing over two-hundred of
6 
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them, and scattering the rest.
67
Meanwhile, Jennison and Moonlight had joined forces,
and begun pushing Thompson back. At dusk, Thompson broke
contact and fell back to the Mockbee Farm. After dark,
Jennison and Moonlight retired to Westport. General Curtis,
aware that Shelby had broken his line at Byram's Ford,
ordered the forces protecting the main ford to fall back to
the entrenchments at Kansas City.68
That same afternoon, Pleasonton caught up with the rear
of Price's army. After crossing the Little Blue, the
Provisional Cavalry Division pressed toward Independence
with McNeil in the advance. McNeil struck Fagan's pickets
east of the town and pushed them back, while Sanborn charged
into the town from the northeast. Sanborn's lead regiment,
the Second Arkansas Union Cavalry, cut off and captured
about 300 members of Cabell's Brigade. General Cabell
narrowly missed capture, escaping by jumping his horse over
a cannon, galloping through the dogtrot of a cabin, then
jumping over a back yard fence. Though the Confederates
offered some resistance, most fled, throwing away equipment
and abandoning two cannon.69
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With hope of intercepting the Confederate wagon train,
Pleasonton ordered McNeil to move south to Little Santa Fe.
Having heard nothing from Curtie, Pleasonton requested that
Smith's infantry be sent to his aid. Reluctantly, Rosecrans
ordered Smith, who was at Chapel Hill, to shift north to
Independence. Meanwhile, General Brown and the First
Brigade, who were pushing after the Confederates, exhausted
their ammunition. Colonel Winslow and the Fourth Brigade
then assumed the advance, attacking recklessly in the dark.
Clark's Brigade now held tne Confederate rearguard, and
though his men resisted fiercely, they steadily retreated
down the Byram's Ford Road. At ten thirty, Pleasonton
called off the attack and oraered General Brown to move
forward, relieve Winslow, and attack at daylight.70
Price's main objective that night was getting his train
to safety, but he still had hopes of defeating Curtis before
confronting Pleasonton. The wagon train and recruits were
sent south on the Harrisonville Road toward Little Santa Fe,
with Cabell's Brigade to protect them. Price ordered Shelby
and Fagan to move toward Westport at dawn and attack Curtis,
and posted Marmaduke on the west bank of Byram's Ford with
instructions to resist Pleasonton's advance.71
Curtis also decided to take the offensive at dawn, and
70 gE, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 313, 328, 341, 683.
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ordered General Blunt to position his division along Brush
Creek, two miles south of Westport. Blunt deployed
Jennison's and Ford's Brigades in the timber along the north
bank of the creek, and placed Moonlight where he could
strike the Confederate left flank or move in behind and
support Ford and Jennison. As more militiamen became
available, Curtis ordered them south to support Blunt.72
At dawn, Shelby moved northward with two of Fagan's
brigades in support. Simultaneously, Blunt ordered the
Union advance, and Ford and Jennison moved across Brush
Creek, through a stand of timber, and over the heights to
the prairie. When the two sides clashed in the mist, the
Federals fell back to the timber where they were able to
stem the Confederate advance. But after an hour, the blue
cavalrymen retreated back across Brush Creek.
Shelby did not press his advantage. He had to wait for
ammunition to be brought up, and though it reached him
within an hour, the Confederate initiative had been lost.
Meanwhile, General Curtis arrived in Westport and took
charge. He ordered Blunt to reconnoiter the front and
adjust the line to accommodate the militia that was coming
down from Kansas City. All the while, both sides continued
skirmishing and cannonading, with little damage to either.
When Colonel Blair's Third Brigade had reached its
position, Curtis ordered tne line forward. About that time
na, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 485, 575.
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a German farmer, George Thoman, out looking for his mare
that was stolen by Confederates the previous night, offered
to show General Curtis a defile that led to the prairie
south of the heights. Curtis accepted, and followed Thoman
up a narrow gulch which brought them over the heights to a
position on Shelby's left flank. Curtis immediately ordered
the 9th Wisconsin Battery forward and into action.
Shelby's men, totally surprised by the flanking
artillery fire, fell back across a small valley where they
held as Collins brought his battery into position to engage
the 9th Wisconsin. Meanwhile, the Confederate retreat
brought Blunt over the heights to the stone fences the
Confederates had just evacuated. The Federals halted
briefly to adjust their lines, then for the next two hours
the rolling prairie south of the heights of Brush Creek
became the scene of cavalry charges and counter-charges,
close pistol combat on horseback, and short range artillery
duels as the Confederates were slowly pushed southward.
As the lines moved, so did the artillery. One of
Collins' "pet parrots" burst at the first fire, but he
fought on with the remaining three. Curtis had more than
thirty cannon, which took a devastating toll on the
Confederates. At one point, Colonel James McGhee, commander
of an Arkansas cavalry regiment in Dobbin's Brigade, led his
men in a close order charge down Wornall's Lane to take one
of the Federal batteries. Captain Curtis Johnson, of
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Company E, 15th Kansas Cavalry of Jennison's Brigade, led a
counter-charge into the flank of the Arkansans. During the
melee that ensued when the two masses of horsemen collided
at full speed, Johnson and McGhee fought a personal duel on
horseback with revolvers in which both were badly wounded.
Additional Federal cavalry charged into the fray, and the
Arkansans retreated.
Throughout the morning, General Price watched the fight
between Shelby and Curtis. But when he received word that
the wagon train was in danger, he sent Shelby and Marmaduke
instructions to fall back as soon as they could safely do
so, then went to find the train. Meanwhile, Shelby had
fallen back to a row of stone fences just north of the
Wornall House, and Fagan was with part of his division at
the Harrisonville Road, ready to support Marmaduke.
Learning that Marmaduke was retreating from Byram's Ford,
Shelby ordered Jackman to find the wagon train. Jackman had
not gotten far when he met a courier from Fagan requesting
his help "at a gallop" because the prairie between the
Harrisonville Road and Byram's Ford "was dark with
Federals."7
East of the Big Blue, it was eight o'clock before
mThe account of the Battle of Westport was drawn from
the following sources: OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 484-91,
635-36, 658-59, 667-68, 676; Edwards, Shelby and His Men,
430-33; Hinton, Rebel Invasion of Missouri and Kansas, 149-
67; Blunt, "General Blunt's Account of His Civil War
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Pleasonton had launched his attack. Impatient at not
hearing the sounds of battle, he rode to the front where he
found the First Brigade strung out along the road and in no
condition to attack. Infuriated, Pleasonton relieved Brown
of command, replaced him with Colonel John F. Philips of the
First Missouri State Militia Cavalry, and ordered him to
attack across the ford in conjunction with Winslow's Fourth
Brigade.
Winslow immediately ordered his artillery to fire on
the Confederate position across the river, and sent a
battalion of the Fourth Iowa Cavalry down a ravine along the
right side of the road. Philips led his men dismounted
along the left side of the road where they took heavy fire
as they rushed toward the ford. But the Iowans were able to
cross unobserved, and they created a diversion that allowed
Philips to cross. Winslow then moved the rest of his
brigade forward.
Marmaduke's main line was on a ridge about a thousand
yards from the ford. Between the Confederates and the ford
was a rock ledge that dropped off fifteen to twenty feet,
providing a natural barrier to an attacker. Finding the
boulders too high to scale on horseback, Philips ordered a
mounted attack up the road, but two charges were thrown
back. With Winslow now in position, the Federals dismounted
and scrambled up the rock ledge. As they formed at the top,
the Confederate fire intensified, and Colonel Winslow was
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wounded in the leg and forced to turn the brigade over to
Lieutenant Colonel Frederick W. Benteen of the 10th Missouri
Volunteer Cavalry. The blue line then pushed up the ridge
and into the Confederate line. After a stubborn resistance,
Marmaduke's men fell back and fled across the prairie.74
As the First and Fourth Brigades reformed, Pleasonton
arrived with Sanborn's Third Brigade and pursued the
Confederates westward. At the Harrisonville Road, Jackman
hastily threw his brigade into line with Fagan's troops,
dismounted it, and allowed Sanborn to come within a hundred
yards before opening fire. Sanborn reeled back, and the
Confederates counter-charged. But then Benteen and Philips
charged into the fight, and Fagan's men scattered to the
south, with Jackman holding the rearguard.75
Jackman's departure left Shelby with only the Iron
Brigade to hold back the Army of the Border. Then Curtis,
hearing the noise of Pleasonton's attack, ordered a charge
all along his front. Though the Iron Brigade counter-
charged, flanking artillery fire from one of Pleasonton's
advance batteries caused Shelby's men to flee southward.
They retreated until they reached a row of stone fences
where the troopers rallied and fought off the combined
AThe account of the Battle of Byram's Ford was drawn
from the following sources: 02E, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1,
313, 340-41, 347, 350-51, 635, 684; Scott, The Story of a 
Cavalry Regiment, 321-25.
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attacks of Curtis and Pleasonton. After buying time for the
train and Marmaduke's and Fagan's men to escape, Shelby
withdrew and assumed the rearguard of the retreating Army of
Missouri 
76
On the Union far left, things did not go so well.
General John McNeil was slow in moving from Independence,
and at daylight he was far from Little Santa Fe. At a point
near Hickman Mills he came upon the wagon train where he
believed that he was facing "the entire force of the enemy."
All morning he skirmished at long range with the
Confederates, and that afternoon he ordered a cautious
advance which fell back after General Cabell sent out a
heavy line of skirmishers to fire the prairie grass.
Afterward, McNeil kept his distance and allowed the train to
escape.
Though Price had been routed, his army was intact.
McNeil's blunder was the second lost opportunity for total
Union victory. The first occurred when Smith's infantry
were ordered from Chapel Hill to Independence. Had they
continued marching westward they could have easily blocked
the Confederate retreat. But that afternoon found them at
Byram's Ford where they assisted in collecting the dead and
76 QE, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 486, 659, 667-68;
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caring for the wounded.
The exact number of killed, wounded, and missing in the
three days of fighting from the Little Blue to Westport is
unknown. The fast movement across thirty miles of western
Missouri left no time for gathering statistics. Also, the
absence of reports from several of the Confederate leaders,
inaccuracies, and the fact that reports often list
casualties for the entire campaign makes obtaining a precise
casualty count impossible. Everything considered, 3500
killed and severely wounded on both sides, with 1500 of
those occurring on the 23rd, would be a conservative
estimate.m
The Battle of Westport is sometimes called the
Gettysburg of the West because it resembles the great battle
in Pennsylvania. The three day battle was the largest
conflict west of the Mississippi, the termination of a
Confederate invasion that threatened principle cities, and
the South's last attempt to carry the war northward in that
region. However, unlike General George G. Meade, who
allowed his opponent to retreat from Gettysburg unmolested,
General Curtis decided that "a vigorous pursuit was
necessary."
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Chapter Four
Retreat, Pursuit, and the End
Late that afternoon, Generals Curtis, Pleasonton,
Blunt, and Dietzler, along with Governor Carney and Senator
Lane, met on Indian Creek near the state line to discuss the
pursuit of the routed Confederate army. With his men and
mounts exhausted, General Pleasonton wanted the Missourians
to return to their home stations for the election, and for
the Kansas forces to conduct the pursuit. But Dietzler and
Carney argued that the militia should be relieved because of
their inferior equipment and the need to return to their
civilian occupations and vote in the election. Blunt and
Curtis agreed, and Pleasonton stepped down. Curtis then
released the militia of northern Kansas, and ordered Blunt's
and Pleasonton's troopers to Little Santa Fe where they
would start the pursuit at daylight."
At Little Santa Fe, Blunt argued with Curtis over the
necessity of pursuing Price immediately, but Curtis would
not move until the men had been rested. At sunrise, Blunt
took ele lead with Pleasonton following. Smith's infantry
were sent marching south to be used if the cavalry suffered
"OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 491-92; Hinton, Rebel
Invasion of Missouri and Kansas, 175-77.
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a reversal, but a Harrisonville they were ordered to report
to Rosecrans at Warrensburg. Colonel Moonlight's Second
Brigade, which had been previously detached from the main
body, was moving on the Confederates right flank)"
After retreating from Westport, Price moved twenty-two
miles down the state line on the military road and camped on
the Middle Fork of the Grand River. The following day,
after spending the entire morning getting the wagon train in
marching order, he moved thirty-three miles to the town of
Trading Post on the Marais des Cygnes River, a pace well
below the capability of a cavalry column in the face of
disaster. The train was clearly slowing them down and
allowing the Federals to catch up.82
The Confederate trail was not hard to follow.
Discarded equipment, broken down horses, and sick, wounded
and exhausted men awaiting capture marked their route. At
dusk the Federals reached West Point, having marched fifty
miles. So far, the Confederate retreat had been through
Missouri. But at West Point, the military road veered
westward into Kansas, and from that point the fury of the
retreating Confederates became readily apparent. According
to one Federal, "a perfect saturnalia of destruction seemed
to have reigned." Houses had been sacked, and crops,
81
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haystacks, and barns burned. Women and children ran
frantically about, crazed with terror and grief. Several
elderly men had been murdered, and many other citizens shot
at.a3
According to Shelby's adjutant, Major John Newman
Edwards, the Confederates were "soothing the wounds of
Missouri by stabbing the breast of Kansas." From Little
Santa Fe until they crossed into Kansas, the Confederates
had marched through an area that had been laid waste earlier
by Kansas partisans, who had left only the charred remains
of houses, lines of ashes where fences once stood, and
fields once cultivated full of weeds. The Confederates were
now retaliating with similar acts.84
The Federals spent two hours at West Point eating and
resting, then Curtis ordered General Pleasonton to take the
advance and resume the pursuit. Pleasonton was ill, so he
turned command of the division over to General Sanborn, who
then moved cautiously in the darkness and rain. Meanwhile,
Price had gone into camp on the north side of the Marais des
Cygnes. To delay any pursuers, he posted Cabell's and
Slemons' Brigades on two mounds north of the main camp.
Each mound was about 140 feet in height and one-half mile in
length, and about three hundred yards apart. Cabell was on
°Hinton, Rebel Invasion of Missouri and Kansas, 184-87;
The (Mound City, Kansas) p2rdgr Sentinel, October 28, 1864.
84Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 447-48; Hinton, Rebel
Invasion of Missouri and Kansas, 187.
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the east mound, and Slemons on the west one.85
Around eight o'clock, an advance squadron that General
Blunt had sent out made contact with the Confederate pickets
at the mounds, and then withdrew. General Sanborn reached
the mounds around midnight, and reported to Curtis that the
Confederates were there in force. Because of the darkness,
rain, and mud, Curtis ordered Sanborn not to attack until
dawn. Meanwhile, Price received false information that the
enemy was on his front, and at dawn he began movirg south
with Shelby in the advance. Cabell and Slemons were ordered
to fall back, with Marmaduke becoming the rearguard.
Therefore, Sanborn's men assaulted the mounds to find the
Confederates gone, but could see them retreating across the
river. The Federals then pushed through the hastily
deserted camp, scattered a group of Confederates who feebly
attempted to defend the ford, crossed the river and moved
cautiously forward.86
Clark's Brigade was conducting the Confederate
rearguard, and though they occasionally halted, made no
effort to bring the Federals to battle. Then, with the
Federals about 600 yards in their rear, Clark's men came
upon the wagon train as it was crossing Mine Creek, a
tributary of the Osage River. The ford of the steep-banked
M
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stream was jammed with stragglers and an overturned wagon,
and previous crossings had made the south exit muddy and
slippery.
Marmaduke quickly put Freeman's Brigade into line
covering the ford and then threw Clark in on Freeman's
right. Cabell, whose brigade had not yet crossed the creek,
deployed on Marmaduke's left, overlapping Freeman.
Marmaduke called on Fagan for assistance, and Slemons' and
Dobbin's Brigades came back to the north side of the creek
to Cabell's left. The Confederates had approximately 6300
men and eight pieces of artillery, but they were in a poor
position. With their backs to the steep banks of Mine
Creek, they had no reserves available to stop a
breakthrough, and had no time to dismount and send their
horses to the rear. Also, units had mingled, which caused
the loss of command and control.
Meanwhile, Pleasonton had reassumed command and allowed
Sanborn to stop to feed his men and horses. Benteen and
Philips were moving on line in the advance, with Benteen to
the east of the Fort Scott Road and Philips to its west. As
the Federais came into view the Confederate artillery fired,
but most of the troops were paralyzed with fear. One
soldier believed he was facing a force of fifty to sixty
thousand, and General Clark estimated the Federal strength
at six or seven thousand.
Actually, Benteen and Philips had only 2700 men, and
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there was no communication between their units. But when
Benteen ordered his brigade to charge, Philips followed.
Unfortunately, Benteen's lead regiment, his old 10th
Missouri, covered less than a hundred yards before the men
froze in their tracks. This caused the rest of the brigade
to stop, and Philips' Brigade did likewise. Benteen, livid
with anger, rode out and screamed at his men with "untold
profanity," but to no avail. With only three hundred yards
between them, a Confederate counter-charge could have
devastated the Federals, but none came. Though both sides
exchanged some small arms fire, for the most part they stood
glaring at each other.
Finally, Major Abial Pearce, commander of the 4th Iowa
Cavalry, led his regiment out from behind the 10th Missouri
and charged forward in a two company front at full speed.
They crashed into the right of the Confede/ate line and went
completely through. Philips and the rest of Benteen's
Brigade followed.
Freeman's Brigade, at the center of the Confederate
line, broke before the charge even hit. Within ten or
fifteen minutes, all but the extreme left of the Confederate
line had crumbled. The blue cavalrymen pushed on to the
stream where panic-stricken Confederates, many of whom had
thrown away their rifles, were trying to climb the steep
south bank. Although there were some pockets of resistance,
the Confederates were routed. The Confederate left under
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Colonels Dobbin and Slemons then quickly melted away.
The Confederates lost all eight pieces of artillery,
and had about 500 killed and wounded, with as many more
taken prisoner. Among the prisoners were Generals Marmaduke
and Cabell, Colonel Slemons, and many other field grade
officers. In sharp contrast, Union casualties were light--
eight killed and 56 wounded.
As Philips and Benteen gathered up the prisoners they
found several of them wearing Federal uniforms, and executed
them on the spot. After Sanborn had moved up, the three
brigades moved south toward the Little Osage River, four
miles distant. Generals Curtis and Pleasonton moved with
them, and McNeil and General Blunt's Kansans followed.87
Meanwhile, General Price, who was at the head of the
wagon train, received word that the rear of the train was in
danger. He then sent a dispatch to Shelby, who was already
south of the Little Osage and moving toward Fort Scott, to
come back to the rear. Price then rode back north where he
soon ran into Fagan's and Marmaduke's panic-stricken troops,
most of whom were without arms and "deaf to all entreaties
or commands." Shelby, upon receiving Price's message, also
headed back north. According to one of his officers, Shelby
V
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was so angry that "he had nothing to do all the way to the
rear but stand up in his stirrups and swear with every step
of his horse." After reaching the south bank of the Little
Osage, Shelby deployed the Iron Brigade mounted in three
lines. 88
As the Federals moved forward they met no major
resistance, but their horses were so worn out that they
could move no faster than a walk. At the Little Osage,
McNeil took the advance, crossed the stream, and attempted
to charge. Shelby's first line witnessed McNeil's advance,
fired one volley, then had to retreat because their horses
became excited. The second line fired their only volley and
broke before the first line had retreated through their
ranks. The third line had the advantage of a ditch, and was
able to check the Federals long enough for the others to
fall back. As the Confederates withdrew south, they made
several mo.-e brief stands, firing haystacks, cornfields and
the tall prairie grass to impede the Federal pursuit.89
The wagon train was now crossing the Marmiton River at
a point six miles east of Fort Scott, and like Mine Creek,
the crossing became bottlenecked. Fagan tad succeeded in
rallying a portion of his division, and Clark commanded what
m
OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 636-37; Fred Lee, ed.,
"Recollections of the Third Day's Fighting of the Battle of
Westport" by Major H. J. Vivian, The Battle of Westport, 39.
89Thompson, "Memoirs," 133-34; Edwards, Shelby and His
Men, 450-52; OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 372, 496-97;
Hinton, Rebel Invasion of Missouri and Kansas, 227.
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was left of Marmaduke's men. Shelby then took charge of the
defense, and put them in line with Jackman's Brigade. He
also put Tyler's recruits in behind them. McNeil's and
Benteen's troops then moved up, but their horses were almost
too exhausted to move. Confederate charges by Jackman on
the left and by Tyler's unarmed men on the right held the
Federals in check. Darkness put an end to the
skirmishing."
After the wagon train had crossed the Marmiton, Price
ordered the destruction of all superfluous wagons, excess
artillery ammunition, and the abandonment of all broken-
down animals. The blazing sky and noise from bursting
shells could be seen and heard for miles around, as the
plunder that had been so gleefully gathered during the
halcyon days of the expedition went up in flames. At two
o'clock that morning, Price's army, now little more than a
mob, began trekking southward. By nightfall, they marched
56 miles to Carthage, Missouri, and after resting briefly,
they marched on and went into camp at Newtonia on the 28th.
Though most of the officers wished to keep retreating,
Shelby argued: "It is better to lose an army in actual
battle, than to starve the men and kill the horses." Since
no enemy had been seen since the Marmiton, Price decided to
943QE, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 332-33, 373, 637, 660, 677,
700.
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rest and feed the army.s"
After the fight along the Marmiton, General Pleas-. tc,n
took Philips' and Benteen's Brigades to Fort Scott for food
and forage. Curtis saw the column move off, and went after
it. Upon catching up to Pleasonton, Curtis argued the
necessity to stay on the field and send for supplies. But
Pleasonton, believing that Fort Scott was closer than it
actually was, insisted on going there anyway. Though Curtis
was senior in rank, Pleasonton was from the Department of
the Missouri, and subordinate to Rosecrans.
At Fort Scott, Pleasonton telegraphed Rosecrans and
told him that because of ill health he would be unable to
continue in command, and recommended that the pursuit be
terminated as far as the Missourians were concerned.
Rosecrans agreed, and Pleasonton moved with Philips' Brigade
to Warrensburg with the prisoners and captured cannon.
Sanborn and McNeil were ordered to remain in the pursuit as
far south as their district headquarters of Springfield and
Rolla.
However, Pleasonton may have had other reasons for
wishing to discontinue. Farlier that day, Curtis attempted
to take charge of the prisoners and other spoils taken at
Mine Creek. Fearful of being exhibited through Kansas as an
"electioneering document," Generals Cabell and Marmaduke
91
Edwards, abelby and His Men, 455; Thompson, "Memoirs,"
135-36.
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personally rLquested to Pleasonton that they be sent to
Rosecrans' headquarters. Belief that Curtis would continue
to try to take away the credit that rightfully belonged to
the Missourians may have been the main reason that
Pleascnton wished to cease pursuit.92
Seeing Pleasonton moving toward Fort Scott and
believing that he was doing so under orders, General Blunt
moved his command there also. McNeil's and Benteen's
troopers spent the night on the prairie, without provisions.
At Fort Scott, General Curtis released the remainder of the
militia, and the chase continued the next day with Blunt in
the lead. For the next three days, Blunt pushed forward
rapidly, and on the afternoon of October 28 he found Price
bivouacked on the south edge of Newtonia. Blunt quickly
attacked with only the First and Fourth Brigades, having
previously ordered the Second Brigade and McNeil to move
forward.
Again, it was Shelby who depioyed to meet him. Though
Blunt made effective use of his artillery, the Confederates
had superior numbers. At twilight, Blunt found his left
flank in danger from a heavy column of Confederates, but was
saved by the timely arrival of Sanborn. Shelby continued
fighting until he was nearly out of ammunition, then
92Details of the mix-up in the Federal command can be
found in: OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 314, 342, 503-505;
Monnett, Action  Before Westport, 133-35; Cabell, Cabell's 
Report, 13.
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withdrew under the cover of darkness. The last battle of
the Civil War in Missouri was over."
Curtis was now confident that he could destroy Price.
But the next mornirg, Rosecrans directed all of the
Missourians to return to their districts, and for Benteen to
rejoin Smith. This prohibited further pursuit, since
General Blunt had fewer than 2500 men. Disappointed, Curtis
telegraphed the situation to General Halleck from Newtonia
and then moved to Neosho. There he received a dispatch from
Halleck stating that "Grant desires that Price be pursued to
the Arkansas River...." This clearly overruled Rosecrans,
and Curtis immediately recalled the Missouri troops.
Benteen rejoined him near Newtonia on November 1, but
Philips, at Warrensburg, was too far away to return.
Sanborn and McNeil were quickly reached near Springfield,
and though they both eventually moved as far south as
Cassville, went no further as the land was destitute of
forage .94
After being joined by Benteen, Curtis resumed the
chase. But the delay had caused irreparable damage.
Price's ragged column, now fighting bad weather as well as
exhaustion, staggered into Cane Hill, Arkansas, on November
1. There it obtained the first major food supply it had had
932E, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 507-509, 577-78, 638, 661;
Edwards, Shelby and His  Men, 455-58.
94(2E, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 510-15.
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in days. After learning that a Confederate force was
besieging nearby Fayetteville, Price granted Fagan
permission to take his division with a detachment of
Shelby's men to assist in its capture. They reached
Fayetteville the next day where, despite the pleas and
threats of their officers, Fagan's men refused to attack.
Then word that Blunt was approachirg caused them to lift the
siege. The Army of Missouri had fought its last battle.
The stay at Cane Hill completed the disintegration of
Price's forces. Because the brigades cf Arkansas conscripts
had deserted entirely, and Price ordered Colonels Freeman,
Dobbin and McCray to return to the places where they had
raised their commands, "collect the absentees together," and
to bring them back into the Confederate lines. Jackman's
Brigade and Slayback's Battalion were allowed to leave the
army for "visiting their friends in Northern Arkansas."95
After learning that the
had been heavily reinforced,
Arkansas west of Fort Smith.
Missouri
Federal garrison at Little Rock
Price decided to recross the
On November 4, the Army of
headed for Indian Territory, and two days later,
Curtis reached Cane Hill and pressed after them. On
November 7, the Army of Missouri crossed the Arkansas at
Pheasants Ford, thirty miles west of Fort Smith. Curtis
arrived there the following morning, fired a few parting
95Q_E, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 515, 638-39; Edwards, Shelby
and His Men, 461.
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shots at the Confederate rearguard, and then ordered the
Kansans back to Fort Scott and Benteen to St. Louis.96
The Confederate retreat through Indian Territory was
the crowning horror of the expedition. As General M. Jeff.
Thompson remembered, "The 'pomp and circumstance of glorious
war' were now ended; and before us lay the hardships and
sufferings incident to a soldier's life. Moral courage and
endurance now superceded chivalry and energy, and he who
could suffer most, and complain least was now to be the
champion." According to Major Edwards, "Toil, agony,
privation, sickness, death and starvation commenced," with
the unacclimated recruits suffering the most. Horses
dropped out by the thousands, and others were so worn out
they could not move as fast as a man on foot. Smallpox
swept through the ranks, and straggling was commonplace.
Only Shelby's old brigade maintained any semblence of
discipline and organization.97
On November 10, Price furloughed Cabell's and Slemons'
Brigades, and gave Shelby permission to rest and feed his
command on the Canadian River. Price then headed for Texas
with only Clark's Brigade and the recruits. Eighteen days
and 200 mile later, during which time Shelby rejoined them,
the Army of Missouri reached Clarksville, Texas. At
OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 638-39, 516-19.
97Thompson, "Memoirs," 139-41; Edwards, Shelby and His
Men, 462-65.
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Clarksville, Price received an order from General Magruder
to move to Laynesport, Arkansas, where he rstablished his
headquarters on December 2. Slightly three months after it
had begun, the Missouri expedition was over.
Price claimed that the expedition had been "of the most
gratifying character." In his official report he wrote:
"I marched 1,431 miles; fought forty-three
battles and skirmishes; captured and paroled over
3,000 Federal officers and men; captured 18
pieces of artillery, 3,000 stand c:f small arms, 16
stand of colors..., at least 3,000 overcoats,
large quantities of blankets, shoes, and ready-
made clothing for soldiers, a great many wagons
and teams, large numbers of horses, great
quantities of subsistence and ordnance stores. I
destroyed miles upon miles of railroad, burning
the depots and bridges; and taking this into
calculation, I do not think I go beyond the truth
when I state that I destroyed...property to the
amount of $10,000,000 in value. On the other hand,
I lost 10 pieces of artillery, 2 stand of colors,
1,000 small arms, while I do not think I lost
1,000 prisoners, including the wounded left in
their [the enemy's]hands...I brought with me at
least 5,000 recruits...[and]...am satisfied that
"g2, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 639.
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could I have remained in Missouri this winter the
arm would have been increased 50,000 men."99
In his report to the War Department, Kirby Smith
claimed that the expedition "accomplished all the objects
for which it was inaugurated." He claimed that the troops
drawn off from Sherman helped prevent the fail of Mobile,
weakened Thomas' army in his campaign against Hood, and
enabled Forrest to raid in Tennessee.lw
However, neither of these evaluations can be accepted
as valid. Price and Smith had good reasons for presenting
the expedition in the best possible light: Price because he
led it, Smith because he ordered it, and both because it was
the only war effort in the Trans-Mississippi Department
during the last critical half of 1864.
The expedition failed to capture St. Louis or Jefferson
City, did not cause a mass uprising of southern sympathy and
install a Confederate government in Missouri, and did no
damage to any military installation in Kansas. In fact,
Price failed to accomplish any of his objectives except
obtaining an unarmed and untrained group of recruits.
Furthermore, the accession of these recruits was offset by
the heavy loss of veterans, whose morale was now at an all
time low. They were so ill, exhausted and demoralized that
Magruder assesed them as "not in a fit condition to fight
"Ibid., 640.
ImIbid., Pt. 4. 1068-69.
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any body of men." The statistics about prisoners taken and
property destroyed are also meaningless. Most of the
prisoners were paroled on the spot, and the railroads and
bridges were quickly repaired. Nor could captured weapons
and equipment compensate for all that was worn out, lost, or
thrown away in panic. According to Magruder, the Army of
Missouri returned with fewer arms than it started with.
While the expedition did deprive Sherman of 9,000
infantrymen, it did not prevent his taking Atlanta or do
more than postpone the fall of Mobile. Smith arrived in
Nashville in time to participate in the attacks of 15 and 16
December. The rest of the Union forces that opposed Price
would have served in Arkansas, Missouri, and Kansas anyway.
All that Price and Smith gained in the expedition could not
be offset by the practical destruction of the Trans-
Mississippi's best cavalry forces.
From a strategic standpoint all that can properly be
claimed for the invasion is that it employed troops who
would have been otherwise idle, and that it severely alarmed
and embarrassed the Federals in Arkansas, Missouri, and
Kansas. In connection with the latter, it is interesting to
note that none of the principal Federal leaders in the
campaign benefitted from it. Grant dismissed Steele for
allowing Price to cross and recross the Arkansas and
Rosecrans for allowing Price to remain in Missouri as long
as he did and escape with his army intact. Possibly
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justified in his action against the former, Grant's decision
in the latter was largely motivated by personal prejudice.
Curtis was transferred to command a department in Wisconsin,
and Blunt and
promotion.
The blame for the
expedition lies mainly
infantry commander, he
and stamina to command
Pleasonton received no recognition or
disastrous outcome of the Missouri
with Price himself. Essentially an
was too old and lacked the experience
a cavalry column, and therefore moved
too slowly. His greatest mistake was the assault on Fort
Davidson, and although he had received erroneous information
on the size of the Jefferson City garrison, a quick march
there instead of chasing Ewing would have found the city
lightly defended. Finally, he should have turned south
before he reached Lexington and not fought at Westport.
According to Major Edwards, "Westport was the turning point
in the expedition. While up to this time nothing of
consequence had been accomplished, after it were the horrors
of defeat, hunger, and the pestilence."
Underlying these mistakes were the campaign's
contradictory aims. While ordered to conduct a diversionary
cavalry raid with the major objectives being recruiting and
destroying Federal military facilities, it is evident that
Price was primarily interested in establishing Confederate
rule in Missouri. This political motive, which was at
cross-purpose with the military goals, doomed the campaign
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from the start. In order to establish himself in Missouri,
Price needed a large force, and for that reason he dragged
along the troublesome Arkansas conscripts and huge wagon
train. This made the army incapable of the rapid movement
needed to achieve its military objectives, yet it still
lacked the strength to realize its leader's political hopes.
Price's desire to stay in Missouri as long as possible kept
him from leaving while it was practical to do so, and
resulted in the disasters at Westport and Mine Creek.
Wishful thinking led Price to over estimate pro-southern
sentiment in Missouri, but the fact that he was first a
Missouri politician and then a Confederate general might
explain his failures.
It would have been best if Shelby had conducted the
invasion with only the veteran brigades of Shanks, Clark
and Cabell, with as little artillery and extra supplies as
possible. But its long range stategic effects are equally
questionable. Nevertheless, Shelby would most likely have
avoided the disasters and inflicted the damage at less cost.
But the fact is that prior to the expedition, the Trans-
Mississippi Confederacy was incapable of inflicting enough
damage on the North to affect the strategic outcome of the
war. Following its failure, relative peace prevailed in the
west while the war came to an end in Virginia.
ioi
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The evaluation of the campaign was drawn from the
following sources: gE, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 4, 1076-77,
1098; Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 465, 475-84; Castel,
Epilogue--The Price Court of Inquiry
Following the raid, Governor Thomas Reynolds published
in a Marshall, Texas newspaper serious accusations against
Price, charging him with gross misconduct during the raid.
Wishing to clear himself of these charges, Price asked for a
court martial, but instead, a court of inquiry investigated
his actions. However, it had not reached a verdict when
Kirby Smith surrendered the Trans-Mississippi Department in
May, 1865. Price took the court records, which he believed
exonerated him, to Mexico where he lived on a colony
established by General Shelby and the Iron Brigade. Two
years later, Price returned to St. Louis where he fell in
during a cholera epidemic and died on September 29, 1867,
and was buried in Bellfontaine Cemetery.102
Sterling Price and the War in the West, 251-55.
102IR, Ser. 1, Vol. 41, Pt. 1, 701-29; Edwards, Shelby
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